SAMIR AMIN
april 2014
THE ALGERIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Algeria and Egypt share much in
common inherited from Boumedienne and Nasser’s time. These two similar national
popular projects of industrialisation and modernisation achieved important
positive social progress, but were unable to move beyond their limits and thus
opened the way to reversal. Reactionary political Islam took advantage of the
social disaster produced by the
submission of post Boumedienne and post Nasser regimes to the neo liberal recipes. Yet in the two
countries this sad false alternative was defeated, at least for the time being.
Nevertheless there are major differences between the two countries which ought
to be mentioned.
The Algerian pre-colonial society
had been thoroughly disintegrated by the onslaught of the French colonisation;
and the political power of its former aristocratic ruling class plainly
removed. The result was that Algeria became a plebeian society whose
citizens aspire to equality to an extent unknown elsewhere in the Arab
countries. The Algerian liberation war further reinforced these exceptional
aspirations. In this respect the historical travel of Algeria differs from
other. In Egypt modernisation was constructed from the very beginning, in the
time of Mohammad Ali Pacha, by the Egyptian ruling class which unwrapped into
an aristocratic bourgeoisie, albeit accepting later its submission to the
Imperial British and later US order.
In Algeria the “Islamic Salvation
Front” revealed its criminal face throughout the civil war that it initiated by
its own decision. It was defeated by the Army and the State with the support of
the people. The Algerian State, under President Bouteflika, also defeated the
project of establishing in the Western Sahara of a so called Islamic “State”
(named “Sahelistan”) at the expense of
Algeria, Mali and Niger. This “emirate”, on the pattern of the Gulf States,
would have monopolised the oil, uranium and other mineral wealth and aligned on
the US pattern of globalisation.
Chadli Benjedid who succeeded to
Boumedienne had proceeded along the same extreme policies as those of Sadat and
Mubarak : unlimited privatisations, personal involvement of top officers in the
plunder of State property, dismantlement of the national control of oil, uncontrolled
opening to transnationals, corruption. The Islamic Front intended to pursue
these policies, but to the exclusive benefit of its “emirs”, just like Morsi
did. But in Algeria after the civil war, with Bouteflika, these policies were
partly corrected with steps taken to restore State control over the economy and
in particular oil, including re-nationalisations, along with concessions to the
democratic and social demands and the rights of the Amazighs far more actual than
elsewhere in the Arab region. Therefore no surprise that Algeria offers signs
of a stronger capacity to resist imperialist global order than many other
countries. The Algerian ruling class is certainly divided and ambiguous; but
national aspiration is still alive among many of its leaders, in contrast with,
for instance, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, where the local bourgeoisie is
entirely aligned and submitting to global imperialism. For all these reasons
Algeria is a potential enemy that the West intends to destroy, if not through
an Islamic regime (which was defeated), at least through the manipulation of
the legitimate democratic demands, eventually the secession of the Sahara and
the Kabyle region.
The election of Bouteflika is no
surprise. In spite of his age and health a majority supports his plan for the
recovery and certainly rejects a come-back of the Islamists. Moreover his
election gives time to settle the internal conflicts among the ruling classes
and avoid chaos. But the people voted with no enthusiasm; they expect more than
what has been achieved. The future of Algeria remains unsettled. A
consolidation of an independent policy associated with social progress, which
is the condition for its success, implies, as elsewhere in today’s world,
significant advances in the democratisation of the society. Whether this
challenge is understood and taken up by the political forces both supporting
the regime or fighting it remains uncertain.
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